Contracts - Specific Performance - Intoxication as a Defense by Splitt, Ronald
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 33 Number 1 Article 9 
1957 
Contracts - Specific Performance - Intoxication as a Defense 
Ronald Splitt 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Splitt, Ronald (1957) "Contracts - Specific Performance - Intoxication as a Defense," North Dakota Law 
Review: Vol. 33 : No. 1 , Article 9. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol33/iss1/9 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. 
For more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
RECENT CASES
the state court. The Supreme Court said in StefaneUi v. Minarda that it
would not interfere in state criminal proceedings to suppress evidence ille-
gally obtained because of the special delicacy of the adjustment to be pre-
served between federal equitable power and state adminstration of its own
law.20
Another argument against the decision laid down in this case is that it
places additional restraints on federal law enforcement officials, thus making
the apprehension of criminals more difficult. It has been argued that, as in
the instant case, it would have the effect of releasing upon society criminals
that are known to be guilty.21
Despite the rather weak authority for the decision reached in .this case, it is
submitted that the results flowing from the decision should be beneficial. Some
feel that existing law does not provide sufficient protection from the arbitrary
and illegal acts of law enforcement officers.22 On the state level, suits against
a policeman are generally fruitless because of his financial condition, and the




CONTRACTS - SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE - INTOXICATION AS A DEFENSE. - In
an action for specific performance of a contract for a sale of land brought by
the vendee against the administratrix of the deceased vendor, the defense of
intoxication of the vendor at the time of the execution of the contract was
asserted. The District Court entered judgment for the plaintiff vendee and
denied defendant's motion for trial de novo. On appeal, the Supreme Court
ol North Dakota held that the judgment of the lower court was correct in
denying the defense of intoxication on the basis of the evidence presented.
Christianson v. Larson, 77 N.W.2d 441 (N. D. 1956).
The early common law theory which provided that intoxication was no de-
fense to the validity of a contract' has undergone a transformation so that
today most states hold that a contract entered into by a party "excessively"
intoxicated is voidable as to him. - What is meant by "excessive" intoxication
has apparently not been precisely defined, but the common conception is that
the intoxication must be so great as to deprive one of reason and understand-
ing, thus rendering him incapable of comprehending the nature and conse-
quences of his act.3 This excessive intoxication to be effective as a defense must
occur at the time the contract was executed. 4 The time within which excessive
19. 342 U. S. 117 (1951).
20. Id. at 120.
21. Comment, 42 Mich. L. 1Rev. 910 (1944) (Such decisions tend to "handicap law
enforcement . . . and are . . . contrary to the public interest . . .")
22. Orfield, Criminal Procedure From Arrest to Appeal, 28-31 (1947).
23. Id. at 28, 29.
1. 2 Kent Comm. 451 (10th ed. 1860); Buch v. Breinig, 113 Pa. 310, 6 Ati. 86
(1886) (dictum).
2. E.g. Hauge v. Bye, 51 N.D. 848, 201 N.W. 159 (1924); Spoonheim v. Spoonheim,
14 N. D. 380, 104 N.W. 845 (1905); In re Thorne's Estate, 344 Pa. 503, 25 A.2d 811
(1942); Ex parte Bums, 194 Wash. 293, 77 P.2d 1025 (1938).
3. Martin v. Harsh, 231 III. 384, 83 N.E. 614 (1907); Keedick v. Brogan, 116 Neb.
339, 217 N.W. 583 (1928); Renfeldt v. Brush-McWilliams Co., 45 N. D. 224, 176 N.W.
838 (1919); Harlow v. Kingston, 169 Wis. 521, 173 N.W. 308 (1919).
4. Emerson v. Shirley, 188 La. 196, 175 So. 909 (1937); Simpson, Contracts 293
(1954).
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intoxication may be averred in order to nullify the contract varies. 5 A North
Dakota statute requires that a contract must be rescinded promptly upon dis-
covery of facts giving rise to a right of recission. 6 Failure to disaffirm within a
".reasonable" time after acquiring such knowledge is deemed an election to
affirm it. What constitutes a "reasonable" time is not definite but depends
upon the facts of the particular case.8 The North Dakota Supreme Court has
suggested that the morning after the contract was entered into is a reasonable
time, 9 while a period of seven years was considered too long.1° A party was
held not guilty of laches when he failed to rescind almost a year after dis-
covery of fraud and when no rights of third parties intervened and he had
received no consideration."
There is a presumption that a signed contract is valid." This requires the
party asserting intoxication as a defense to assume the responsibility and bur-
den of .proving it. 3 There must be clear and convincing proof of excessive
intoxication before the court will sustain this defense. 4 The degree of in-
toxication is a question of fact," and the evidence is usually established by
the testimony of witnesses, but their testimony is subject to the final deternli-
nation by the jury.'
6
The holding in the principal case conforms to the general rule that there
must be concrete and conclusive proof of excessive intoxication. The mere
fact that the party attempting to rescind was known to have been a habitual
drunkard will not give rise to a right to rescind,17 unless he was excessively
intoxicated at the execution of the contract.' 8 In the instant case the Admin-
istratrix failed to establish such proof and was required to execute the deed as
a contractual obligation of the deceased.' 9
RONALD SPLITT.
CRIMINAL LAW - NATIONAL MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT ACT - CONSTRUCTION
OF "STOLEN." - Appellant was convicted under the Dyer Act for having
appropriated to his own use and driven across a state line, an automobile
bailed to him by the conditional vendee for the purpose of returning it to the
conditional vendor. The conviction was affinned on appeal by the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals which held that the word "stolen" as used in
5. Mann Chevrolet Co. v. Associates' Inv. Co., 125 F.2d 778 (8th Cir. 1942)
(dictum).
6. N. D. Rev. Code § 9-0904 (1) (1943).
7. Frankish v. Fed. Mortg. Co., 30 Cal. App.2d 700, 87 P,2d 90 (1939); Hauge v.
Bye, 51 N. D. 848, 201 N.W. 159 (1924); Spoonheim v. Spoonheim, 14 N. D. 380,
104 N.W. 845 (1905).
8. Mann Chevrolet Co. v. Associates' Inv. Co., 125 F.2d 778 (8th Cir. 1942).
9. Hauge v. Bye, 51 N. D. 848, 201 N.W. 159 (1924).
10. Spoonhein v. Spoonheim, 14 N. D. 380, 104 N.W. 845 (1905).
11: Deasy v. Taylor, 39 Cal. App. 235, 178 Pac. 538 (1919).
12. Bradley v. Industrial Commission, 51 Ariz. 291, 76 P.2d 745 (1938); Indemnity
Ins. Co. v. Macatee Ins. Co., 129 Tex. 166, 101 S.W.2d 553 (1397). See also Crutcher
Laboratory v. Crutcher, 288 Ky. 709, 157 S.W.2d 314, 319 (1942).
13. Lyon v. Jackson, 132 N.E.2d 779 (Ohio 1955). See also Brugman v. Brugman,
93 Neb. 408, 140 N.W. 781 (1913).
14. Emerson v. Shirley, 188 La. 196, 175 So. 909 (1937); In re Null's Estate, 302
Pa. 64, 153 At. 137 (1930).
15. Taylor v. Koenigstein, 128 Neb. 809, 260 N.W. 544 (1935).
16. Cardinal v. Cardinal, 131 S.W.2d 1005 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Jones v. Selman,
109 S.W.2d 1003 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
17. Snead v. Scott, 182 Ala. 97, 62 So. 36 (1913).
18. Taylor %. Koenigstein, 128 Neb. 809, 260 N.W. 544 (1935).
19. Francis v. Ferguson, 246 N. Y. 516, 159 N.E. 416 (1927); In re Fullmer, 319
Pa. 192, 197 Atl. 545 (1935); In re Murphy, 191 Wash. 180, 71 P.2d 6 (1937).
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